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Abstract
We examine welfare effects of real-time pricing in electricity mar-
kets. Before stochastic energy demand is known, competitive retailers
contract with final consumers who exogenously do not have real-time
meters. After demand is realized, two electricity generators compete
in a uniform price auction to satisfy demand from retailers acting on
behalf of subscribed customers and from consumers with real-time
meters. Increasing the number of consumers on real-time pricing does
not always increase welfare since risk-averse consumers dislike uncer-
tain and high prices arising through market power. In the Bertrand
case, welfare is the same with all or no consumers on smart meters.
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1 Introduction
Real-time pricing of electricity for residential households and small businesses
was for a long time technologically and economically not viable. Tradition-
ally, final consumers had a meter that simply measured the total amount
of electricity consumed without keeping track of when consumers actually
consumed what amounts of electricity. For this reason it was not possible to
differentiate prices to reflect the scarcity of electricity at each point in time,
which made consumers unable to react to price signals. This lack of con-
sumer response translates into highly inelastic market demand in electricity
wholesale markets, which facilitates the exercise of market power especially
in peak times, (see, e.g., Stoft, 2002, p.78f). In addition the absence of price
signals prevents any consumption smoothing over time and thus aggravates
the system operator’s problem to constantly balance supply and demand.
Since electricity is hardly storable, not achieving a balance results in costly
blackouts and consumer rationing.
Recent technological developments and the rising need for more efficient
power grids have however increased the attention on exploiting efficiency po-
tentials through smarter metering. A number of firms have invented new me-
ter technologies to reap such efficiency gains, which led to a drastic increase
in venture capital for smart meter technologies.1 This new development of
smart grids and smart meters aims at allowing electricity providers to trans-
mit time varying price signals, that in turn enable even residential households
and small businesses to adjust their consumption over the day accordingly.2
However, the installation of smart meters and smart grids changes the design
of all current transmission networks and is extremely costly. Thus, there is
considerable uncertainty in the welfare effects and the profitability of real-
time metering technology. We ask how the introduction of real-time metering
will benefit consumers, producers and overall welfare.
1See The Economist (2007b).
2See The Economist (2007a).
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That prices should fluctuate if capacities cannot easily be adapted to
fluctuating and uncertain demand is an insight gained from the peak-load
pricing literature that started already in the fifties (for a survey see Crew
et al. (1995)). More recently, Borenstein and Holland (2005) developed a
model where firms invest in electricity generating capacity in the first stage
and then compete in a perfectly competitive electricity market for a certain
number of periods with a time-varying demand. They show that the market
outcome is not efficient if not all consumers are on real time pricing schedules.
Furthermore, the market outcome is less than second-best efficient, even if
one takes into account that some consumers are priced only according to the
average wholesale costs of serving them with a time-invariant price instead
of paying the time-variant wholesale price in each single period. However,
increasing the number of customers on real-time pricing does not necessarily
increase social welfare, although having all customers on real-time pricing is
always Pareto superior to having some of them on time-invariant rates.3
We derive efficiency effects of real-time pricing when generating firms
have market power in the electricity wholesale market and consumers are
risk-averse. We explicitly distinguish between the wholesale and the retail
market of electricity, and assume market power in the wholesale market with
only two firms generating and selling electricity. The retail sector is per-
fectly competitive. Like in Borenstein and Holland (2005), we assume that
consumers who are on real-time pricing schedules can express their demand
on the wholesale market either directly or indirectly via their competitive
retailer. The consumers who are not on real-time meters need to contract
with retailers before their own and the aggregate level of demand is known.
Therefore they will finally pay the same price no matter what the level of de-
mand will be. Joskow and Tirole (2006) and Joskow and Tirole (2007) both
3Holland and Mansur (2006) simulate the short-run efficiency gains without capacity
investments from increasing the share of customers on real-time pricing in a model close
to Borenstein and Holland (2005) for the PJM market and can only identify moderate
efficiency increases for this case.
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mainly focus on the retail market without taking into account repercussions
to the potentially non-competitive wholesale market.4 Contrary to the for-
mer and in line with the latter we abstract from monopoly distribution and
assume that all retailers compete on a level playing field. Like Borenstein and
Holland (2005), we model uniform retail prices whereas Joskow and Tirole
(2006) and Joskow and Tirole (2007) allow for two-part tariffs.
Neither Borenstein and Holland (2005) nor the empirical studies that
try to estimate the welfare effects of existing real-time pricing initiatives
for large industrial customers (see Taylor et al. (2005)) take into account
the insurance effect of fixed prices. Most analyses implicitly assume that
the volatile demand is certain and therefore sum up the consumer surplus
for all different time periods to determine consumer welfare.5 We instead
assume demand uncertainty and consider concave surplus functions for our
costumers when deriving welfare statements. Taking this risk aversion into
account explicitly allows us to check whether the positive efficiency effects of
real-time electricity pricing are potentially counteracted by the increase in
price risks that risk-averse consumers dislike.
Our model is based on Boom and Buehler (2007). We introduce real
time pricing and differentiated consumers, that is, each consumer demands
a different quantity of electricity although they are all exposed to the same
demand shock. Motivated by the observation that in most electricity mar-
kets larger consumers, e.g. private businesses, installed smart meters before
smaller customers such as private households did, we assume that consumers
with the highest demand will be served with real-time metering and pricing
first.6 As the degree of real-time pricing increases, the consumers that enter
4Joskow and Tirole (2007) derive optimal retail prices, rationing rules and capacity
investments with price-sensitive and price-insensitive consumers.
5The same is true for a recent study by Allcott (2012), where he simulates the effect
of introducing smart grid technology to 20% of the PJM market, taking into account the
effect this has on the electricity market, the capacity market and entry into the market.
6Empirical studies of existing real time pricing programs focus mainly on large indus-
trial customers (see e.g. Patrick and Wolak (2001), Taylor et al. (2005), Boisvert et al.
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real-time pricing in our model will have a lower demand than those already
in the program. Hence, our model set up also allows us to conclude whether
real-time pricing is more beneficial for large or small customers.
The next section presents the modeling framework. Section three derives
the model outcome and presents wholesale and retail market equilibria. In
section four, we present comparative statics in the level of real-time pricing
and derive welfare statements. Section five concludes.
2 The model
In a mass of N consumers with N = 1, each consumer can be of a different
type α which is drawn from a uniform distribution on
[
1
2
, 3
2
]
. The preferences
of a consumer of type α are represented by the consumer surplus function
V (x, α, ε, p) = α(x− ε)− (x− ε)
2
2
− px, (1)
where p is the electricity price, x the electricity consumed and ε a shock that
affects all consumers alike and is drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1].
Maximizing the surplus with respect to the consumed electricity x yields the
consumer’s individual demand7
x(p, α, ε) = max{α + ε− p, 0}. (2)
We assume that the consumers with small demand, meaning α ≤ α˜, do
not have a smart meter and need to contract with one of the retailers and pay
(2007), and Zarnikau and Hallett (2008)). Allcott (2011) reports on a small scale real-time
pricing experiment with non-randomly selected residential households in Chicago in 2003,
whereas Wolak (2011) uses data from the demand response of a larger group of randomly
selected residential households in the PowerCentsDC experiment to investigate whether
consumers suffer from a cost of taking action when prices change.
7The demand is modeled similarly to Boom and Buehler (2007) and Boom (2009).
However, there all consumers have α = 1 and thus identical demand.
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the retail price p = r. Consumers with a relatively large demand, defined by
α > α˜ are on real-time meters and purchase their electricity directly on the
wholesale market at the wholesale price p = p∗.8 The threshold separating
large and small consumers, i.e. consumers with and without real-time meters,
has to lie within the support of α, that is, 1
2
≤ α˜ ≤ 3
2
.
There are n ≥ 2 retailers who compete a` la Bertrand. Consumers without
a smart meter subscribe to the retailer with the lowest retail price r while
their actual level of demand is still uncertain. For the sake of simplicity we
assume zero retail costs. Retailers’ marginal costs then equal the wholesale
price for which they buy electricity. The retailers announce their customers’
demand for electricity to the wholesale auction after they have observed the
actual level of demand, that is the realization of ε. Retailers with supply
obligations go out of business as soon as their marginal costs, the wholesale
market price p∗, exceeds the retail price r. Then their customers will not
be served with electricity, but the system operator is able to ration retail
consumers and a blackout does not occur.9
Electricity is only produced by two electricity generating firms A and B.
Each generator i = A,B is capacity constrained and owns capacity Ki. Both
generators use an identical technology with constant marginal costs c which
are normalized to zero.10 Generating firms can produce up to their capacity
Ki but not beyond that quantity. They can sell their electricity only via the
8Note that it does not matter whether customers on real-time meters bid their demand
directly into the wholesale auction or whether they have a contract with a perfectly com-
petitive retailer without retail costs. Borenstein and Holland (2005), Joskow and Tirole
(2006) and (2007) also assume that consumers on real-time pricing pay the wholesale price.
9The latter assumption means that the system operator has perfect control over the
grid and can selectively take customers off-line. This assumption is in line with Joskow
and Tirole (2007) and will finally lead to efficient rationing. In the perfect smart grid
scenario, efficient rationing is possible. However, today it is not implementable.
10We abstract from different types of capacity and can therefore not account for potential
welfare effects that might arise from using less peak capacity with high production and
low fixed costs and more base load capacity with low production and high fixed costs. The
simulations by Borenstein (2005) and Allcott (2012) suggest that these effects might be
considerable.
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wholesale market, run by the system operator as a uniform price auction.
Before each firm submits its supply bid to the wholesale market, the total
demand, meaning the level of ε, is publicly known. In the auction each firm
only announces a price pi at and above which they are willing to produce up
to their total capacity. Fabra and von der Fehr (2006) show in their analysis
that despite different optimal bidding strategies the market outcome would
not change if we allowed for a finite but larger number of steps in the bidding
function of the generators.
The system operator runs a uniform price auction.11 To clear the auction,
the system operator first aggregates all submitted capacity at each price bid,
and then finds the market clearing price, that equates supply and the level
of demand stemming from the consumers on smart-meters and the ones that
contract with a retailer and pay the retail price r. Three situations can occur:
1. The capacity of the low-bidding generator is sufficient to satisfy all
demand at this low price. The wholesale price p∗ = pi with pi ≤ pj
and i, j = A,B and only the low bidding firm is called to generate the
amount of electricity necessary to satisfy demand D(p∗, r, α˜, ε).
2. The capacity of the low-bidding firm is insufficient to satisfy demand
at this low price, but the total capacity of both firms is sufficient to
satisfy the demand at the higher of the two prices. The wholesale price
is p∗ = pj with pi ≤ pj and i, j = A,B. The low-bidding firm can
deliver its total capacity Ki whereas the high-bidding firm is rationed
to the amount of electricity that is necessary to satisfy residual demand
(D(p∗, r, α˜, ε)−Ki).
3. The capacity of the low-bidding firm is insufficient to satisfy demand
11Multi-unit uniform price auctions are used in most major electricity markets in Europe
and the US. The other alternative is a discriminatory auction format, to which the UK
market switched in 2001 when introducing the New Electricity Trading Arrangements
(NETA). For a theoretical comparison of both auction formats see Fabra and von der Fehr
(2006).
7
at this low price and total capacity is also insufficient to satisfy the
demand at the higher of the two prices. The wholesale price p∗ is the
price at which total demand satisfies total capacity (D(p∗, r, α˜, ε) =
KA +KB). Both firms generate electricity at their capacity constraint.
All generators are paid the equilibrium price p∗ for all the electricity they
deliver no matter what their price bid was. Before this wholesale auction
is held, retailers contract with the final consumers. Figure 1 illustrates the
timing of the model.
-
Retailers
compete
in retail
Consumers
RTM
subscribe
to the
cheapest
Nature
draws
demand
ε
Consumers
on RTM
and
retailers
bid their
demand
Generators
A and B
bid their
prices
pA and pB
System
Operator
determines
wholesale price
prices
not on
retailer
shock p∗
Figure 1: Timing of the model
In the first stage of the game before the level of demand is known re-
tailers set their retail prices for customers without real time meters. These
customers contract with the retailer who offers the lowest price.12 Then, na-
ture draws the demand shock ε and demand is known to the generators, the
retailers, the consumers with real-time metering and the system operator.
Consumers with real-time metering bid their demand, and non-bankrupt re-
tailers the demand of their contracted customers. The two generators bid
the prices at which they are willing to produce up to their total capacity,
and finally the system operator determines the wholesale electricity price p∗
12The contract is a service contract and implies that the costumers are provided with as
much electricity as they want as long as the retailer does not go out of business. Rationing
rules as discussed in Joskow and Tirole (2007) are not part of the contract and are also
not very common for residential households.
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as described above. We search for the subgame perfect equilibrium of this
game.
3 Analysis of the model
Since we are looking for a subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game we start
the analysis with the last stage of the game, the wholesale market. After
deriving the market outcome of the wholesale market for given retail prices,
capacities and levels of smart metering we determine the retail price for those
customers who do not have a smart meter for given capacities and levels of
smart metering.
3.1 The wholesale market
By the time the wholesale market clears, the demand shock ε ∈ [0, 1] is
known to all market participants. The threshold α˜ ∈ [1
2
, 3
2
] defines the mass
of consumers who are on pre-determined fixed retail prices and the mass
of consumers who have a smart meter and can directly participate in the
wholesale market. This threshold is exogenous and known to all market
participants.
The group with α ≤ α˜ buys electricity via their retailers and pays the pre-
determined retail price r. Given r, their retailers demand a fixed volume of
electricity which is derived from aggregating their individual demand, given
in (2). The retailers’ demand from consumers without a smart meter is
represented by
9
DR(r, α˜, ε, p∗) =

∫ α˜
1
2
α + ε− rdα if p∗ ≤ r ≤ 1
2
+ ε,∫ α˜
r− α + ε− rdα if max
{
p∗, 1
2
+ ε
} ≤ r ≤
α˜ + ε,
0 if either r < p∗ or r > α˜ + ε.
(3)
Retail demand is completely inelastic in the wholesale price p∗. As soon as
the wholesale price exceeds the retail price, r > p∗, retailers stop demanding
and serving their retail customers, because otherwise retailers suffer losses.
The level of fixed retail demand depends on the pre-determined retail price
r. For the retail price, we have to distinguish three cases: In the first case
the retail price is small enough such that all customers with α < α˜ have a
positive demand r ≤ 1
2
+ ε. With 1
2
+ ε < r ≤ α˜+ ε some consumers without
smart metering do not buy any electricity anymore because it is too costly
and with r > α˜ + ε no customer on traditional meters demands electricity.
Consumers with smart meters directly take part in the wholesale market.
Aggregating their individual demand from (2) yields
DW (p∗, α˜, ε) =

∫ 3
2
α˜
α + ε− p∗dα if 0 ≤ p∗ ≤ α˜ + ε,∫ 3
2
p∗−ε α + ε− p∗dα if α˜ + ε < p∗ ≤ 32 + ε,
0 if 3
2
+ ε < p∗.
(4)
Demand from consumers with smart meters is elastic in the wholesale
price p∗. Again, we have to distinguish the three cases where all smart meter
customers have a positive demand (0 ≤ p∗ ≤ α˜ + ε), where some of them
stop buying (α˜+ε < p∗ ≤ 3
2
+ε), and where the price exceeds the reservation
price and all of them stop buying electricity (p∗ > 3
2
+ ε).
Aggregate total demand then is the sum of the demand from the con-
sumers with a predetermined retail price and from those on smart metering
10
6-
3
2
+ ε
α˜ + ε
r
p∗
D(p∗, r, α˜, ε)
Figure 2: Total Demand in the Wholesale Market with r < α˜+ ε
and is given by
D(p∗, r, α˜, ε) = DR(r, α˜, ε, p∗) +DW (p∗, α˜, ε). (5)
Total demand in the wholesale market is sketched in figure 2.
Total demand is discontinuous at p∗ = r if r < α˜ + ε, has the same
constant slope for 0 ≤ p∗ < r and for r < p∗ < α˜ + ε and is convexly
decreasing for α˜ + ε ≤ p∗ ≤ 3
2
+ ε.
The two generators A and B know the total realized demand when they
bid their price into the market. Their optimal bidding strategies depend on
their own and their rival’s capacity KA and KB, on the retail price r, on
the level of smart metering determined by α˜ and on the level of the demand
shock ε.
Proposition 1 With regard to the market equilibria on the wholesale market
we can distinguish five cases.
(i) If Ki ≥ D(0, r, α˜, ε) and Kj ≥ D(0, r, α˜, ε) with i, j = A,B the firms
bid in the unique equilibrium pi = 0 and pj = 0 resulting in the uniform
auction price of p∗ = 0.
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(ii) If 0 ≤ Ki < D(0, r, α˜, ε) and Kj > D(0, r, α˜, ε) with i, j = A,B there
are multiple equilibria. In all these equilibria the firms bid pj = p
∗
j with
p∗j = arg max
p
{p[D(p, r, α˜, ε)−Ki]}
and 0 ≤ pi < p¯i < p∗j where p¯i is implicitly defined by (17). The unique
auction price is p∗ = p∗j .
(iii) If 0 ≤ Ki ≤ Kj < D(0, r, α˜, ε) and D(p∗j , r, α˜, ε) − Kj ≤ Ki < Ki we
have the same equilibria as in (ii). Ki is either defined in equation
(34), (35) or (36).
(iv) If Ki ≤ Kj < D(0, r, α˜, ε) and Ki < Ki ≤ Kj with i, j = A,B the
uniform price auction has two types of equilibria, one type is identical
with the one in (ii), in the other one the firms bid pi = p
∗
i with
p∗i = arg max
p
{p[D(p, r, α˜, ε)−Kj]} ≤ p∗j
and 0 ≤ pj < p¯j < p∗i where p¯j is implicitly defined by the equivalent to
(17). The auction price in the latter type of equilibrium is p∗ = p∗i .
(v) If Ki < Kj and Ki + Kj < D(p
∗
j , r, α˜, ε) with i, j = A,B there are
multiple equilibria in which the two firms bid pi ≤ pˆ and pj ≤ pˆ with
pˆ = {p|Ki +Kj = D(p, r, α˜, ε)} > p∗j ≥ p∗i .
The auction price is nevertheless unique and given by p∗ = pˆ.
Proof: See Appendix A. 
Note that multiple equilibria occur as soon as firms are capacity con-
strained (cases (ii)-(v) of proposition 1). The multiplicity only leads to dif-
ferent equilibrium wholesale prices and different profits for the two generators
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if their capacities are of a relatively similar size and satisfy case (iv) of propo-
sition 1. In this case there exist two types of equilibria where either the high
capacity firm or the low capacity firm bids the high price in equilibrium.
The high price maximizes the monopoly profit on the residual demand. If
the firms’ capacities differ more (cases (ii) and (iii)) it is always the firm with
the larger capacity that bids high and serves the residual demand whereas
the small firm bids low and sells its total capacity. In case (v) the market
does not clear at the monopoly price on the residual demand. The demand
cannot be served by the two firms at this price. The low capacity firm never
has an incentive to bid a higher price than the large capacity firm and the
system operator needs to increase the large capacity firm’s bid to balance the
market.
Whenever multiple equilibria occur, we select the equilibrium in which
the larger firm is bidding the high price. For completely inelastic demand
Boom (2008) argues that the equilibria with the large firm bidding the high
price and the small firm undercutting it, risk-dominate the equilibria where
the roles are reversed. It is beyond the scope of this paper to verify whether
this selection can also be supported with elastic demand. Empirical findings
by Wolfram (1998), however, show that for the UK electricity market it
indeed is the larger firm that is the pivotal bidder and submits the market
clearing price. With identical capacities we assume that each of the two firms
is equally likely to choose the high price in equilibrium.
Figure 3 illustrates all equilibria of proposition 1. For a given demand
shock ε, a given level of real time pricing α˜ and a given retail price r the equi-
librium auction price is a function of the capacity levels of the two firms. The
equilibrium prices depend on each firm’s capacities. As derived in Appendix
A, the borders for which the large and high pricing firm finds it optimal to
price above, at or below the retail price are denoted as K1 and K2, respec-
tively. Whenever both firms can serve the entire market on their own and
have capacities larger than D0 the equilibrium price equals zero which is the
13
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D0
D0
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pˆ > r
p∗A > r
p∗A > r
p∗A > r
p∗B > r
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∗
B > r
r
pˆ > r
r
r
rr
p∗B < r
p∗B < r
p∗A < r
p∗A < r
0
r
-
Figure 3: The Auction Prices in the Wholesale Market for Low Retail Prices
Bertrand outcome. Figure 3 is drawn for relatively low retail prices because
there exist capacity combinations 0 < min{KA, KB} < K1 for which the
equilibrium prices are above the retail price level r. For this case to be true
K1 as defined in (20) in Appendix A.2 needs to be positive which is equiva-
lent to 0 < r < r1, where r1 = {r|K1 = 0} is depicted in figure 4. If K1 < 0,
wholesale prices above the retail price cannot be an equilibrium, unless the
system operator has to set the wholesale price. In the south west corner of
figure 3 we always find an area where the system operator needs to set the
price above the highest price bid to clear the market.13 The discontinuity of
the system operator price regions at min{KA, KB} = K1 is due to the jump
of the potential wholesale price from p∗ > r to p∗ = r, which is induced by
the kink in the demand curve due to the sudden inclusion of the customers
without real time pricing (see the demand in figure 2). The overall pricing
13Borders for these areas are given by Si in (31), (32) or (33) in Appendix A.3. As the
retail price increases these borders shift inward for those areas with min{KA,KB} > K1.
Higher retail prices reduce demand and therefore the system operator needs to interfere
less often to ensure market clearing. When the market outcome is determined by capac-
ities that satisfy min{KA,KB} < K1, increases in the retail price are irrelevant, because
retailers have left the market.
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pattern described in figure 3 is intuitive. The larger the capacities the smaller
is the wholesale price.
Considering the specific equilibrium prices, given in (19), (24) and (28)
Appendix A.2, it becomes clear that the wholesale price depends only on
the capacity of the smaller firm. This is because the smaller firm’s capacity
determines the residual demand for the larger and pivotal firm that decides on
the wholesale price in all cases where at least one firm is capacity constrained.
For higher demand shocks capacities are relatively scarcer and hence the
borders defining the equilibrium prices shift outwards. On the contrary for
increasing retail prices, the borders shift inwards. Figure 4 shows which
wholesale price regimes are relevant given the retail price and the level of
smart metering. For r < r1 all three wholesale price regimes depicted in figure
3 exist. For intermediate retail prices r1 < r < r2 figure 3 would simplify
and wholesale prices above the retail price would no longer be possible. For
r2 < r < α˜ + ε the critical capacity level K2 or K
′
2, as defined in equation
(21) or (25), respectively, are no longer positive.14 In that case figure 3
simplifies even further and 0 ≤ p∗ < r must hold in equilibrium. Note that
for r > α˜ + ε the retail price does not matter any more for the level of
the wholesale price because at these retail prices no retail customer has a
positive demand. Figure 3 would have only one horizontal and vertical line,
which would no longer be defined by min{KA, Kb} = D′0 with D′0 defined in
(26), but by min{KA, Kb} = D′′0 with D′′0 defined in (29) in Appendix A.2.
Depending on whether 0 < min{KA, Kb} < D′′0 holds or min{KA, Kb} > D′′0
we would either have p∗ > 0 or p∗ = 0.15
14The critical retail price r2 is defined by either r2 = {r|K2 = 0} or r2 = {r|K ′2 = 0}
depending on whether it exceeds the level r = ε + 12 or not, so on whether all retail
customers have still a positive demand or not. The critical retail price r2 increases and is
continuous in α˜ as is sketched in figure 4.
15With completely inelastic demand, as in Boom and Buehler (2007), p∗ > 0 or p∗ = 0
always are the only possible outcomes.
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Figure 4: Critical Retail Price Levels
3.2 The retail market
Retailers compete in prices and do not have any other retail costs than the
price they need to pay for electricity on the wholesale market. Therefore
all retailers compete the price down to a level where they do not generate
positive profits any more. Retailers have zero profits if they find themselves
for every potential demand induced by ε in a situation where the wholesale
price satisfies p∗ ≥ r. Looking at the lattice pattern in figure 3 it becomes
obvious that this condition is satisfied if K2 > min{KA, KB} or, if it becomes
relevant, K ′2 > min{KA, KB} for all ε ∈ [0, 1]. Retailers compete in the
retail price until the generating firms’ capacities ensure a wholesale price
that equals the retail price at a demand shock of ε = 0. This condition
guarantees zero profits for retailers for all ε ∈ [0, 1] and all p∗ ≥ r. From this
idea we can derive the following proposition which describes the retail price
in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Assume Ki ≤ Kj, then there is a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium in which all retailers set r = r¯ = 0, if Ki > 1. If Ki ≤ 1 then
there are multiple subgame perfect Nash equilibria. In all these equilibria the
16
retailers charge their customers retail prices which satisfy 0 ≤ r ≤ r¯. The
level of r¯ depends on the capacity levels Ki and Kj and on the level of smart
metering reflected in α˜. The definition of r¯ is given by
r¯ =

3
2
−√2(Ki +Kj) if 0 ≤ Ki <
min
{
9
8
− 2Kj(9−(9−2α˜)α˜−Kj)
(3−2α˜)2 ,
1−2Kj
2
}
,
3− α˜− 1
2
√
27− 4α˜(6− α˜) + 8Ki if max
{
9
8
− 2Kj(9−(9−2α˜)α˜−Kj)
(3−2α˜)2 , 0
}
≤ Ki < min
{
1
2
(α˜− 1
2
), Kj
}
,
1−Ki −Kj if 1−2Kj2 ≤ Ki ≤ min{1− (5−2α˜)Kj3−2α˜ ,
Kj},
2(1−Ki)
5−2α˜ if max
{
1
2
(
α˜− 1
2
)
, 1− (5−2α˜)Kj
3−2α˜
}
≤ Ki < min{1, Kj},
0 if 1 ≤ Ki ≤ Kj.
Proof: See Appendix B. 
Note that we potentially have multiple equilibria. We follow the conven-
tion in economics that we assume that firms stop undercutting each others
prices as soon as they generate zero profits. For retailers this condition trans-
lates into all retailers setting r = r¯ if 0 ≤ min{KA, KB} < 1 and r = r¯ = 0
otherwise. The relationship between the different capacity levels and the
retail price is characterized in figure 5.
From proposition 2 it becomes clear that the retail price r¯ only changes
marginally in the level of smart metering if we are in the cases represented
by the second and fourth line of its definition. These are the cases where
the generating firms’ capacities are sufficient such that the system operator
does not need to interfere with the generators’ price bidding on the electricity
wholesale market for the smallest demand shock ε = 0. For these cases the
retail price decreases if the level of smart metering increases because ∂r¯
∂α˜
> 0
and a lower α˜ means more customers with smart meters. A larger number of
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Figure 5: Retail Price with Different Capacities for Ki ≤ Kj
smart meters decreases the retail demand and hence the retail price is low-
ered. In addition, because of the lower retail demand the retail market is now
for more combinations of KA and KB fully covered instead of only partially
covered. Thus, for the capacities for which ∂r¯
∂α˜
> 0 holds consumers without
smart meters will always benefit from more (other) consumers having a smart
meter and taking part directly in the wholesale market. The same effect has
been found by Borenstein and Holland (2005). Since in their analysis all
consumers were identical and more smart metering did not imply reducing
the willingness to pay of the customers without a smart meter, this result is
not simply driven by the lower willingness to pay of the customers without
real time prices. Retail prices are determined by fierce price competition by
the retailers who cannot just expropriate the consumers’ rent.
If the capacities of the electricity generating firms are so low that the
system operator needs to interfere with the price bidding of the generators
for all possible levels of the demand shock ε ∈ [0, 1] then the retail price does
marginally not respond to a higher degree of metering. The main reason for
this is that how consumers are split and how price responsive the wholesale
demand is on the margin, does not influence the wholesale prices. Instead,
wholesale prices are always determined by equalizing total demand with to-
tal capacity. Then, given that the retail price is determined by the lowest
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possible wholesale price being below or equal to the retail price, also the re-
tail price solely depends on the firms’ capacities. The higher the firms’ total
capacity is, the lower is the lowest possible wholesale and the resale price.
4 Comparative statics in the level of smart
metering
Retailers always have zero profits and therefore do not have an impact on
welfare as the level of smart metering changes. Only their competitive retail
price and the wholesale market price effect welfare. Thus, we consider how
a change in the level of smart metering changes retail and wholesale prices
for all possible states of demand realizations. We use these prices to derive
expected profits, consumer surplus and welfare ex ante of the demand real-
ization. For the sake of tractability we only look at the cases in which the
retail prices are indeed determined by α˜ and the SO does not have to inter-
vene in the market. This in turn assumes that the firms are always investing
sufficiently in their capacity endowments and the market always clears at the
residual monopoly price of the high bidding firm.
We use the consumer surplus function and the three equilibrium retail
prices in proposition 2 that depend on α˜ (cases (i), (ii) and (iv)) to calculate
expected welfare. From the consumer surplus function in equation (1) we
know that those consumers who are served will achieve a surplus of
V (α + ε− p, α, ε, p) = α(α− p)− (α− p)
2
2
− p(α + ε− p), (6)
where due to our assumption that the SO never has to intervene p is either
the wholesale price p∗ = p∗j > r that varies according to the state of demand
ε or the predetermined retail price r that does not change with the demand
realization. Those consumers who are either not served or who decide them-
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selves that they do not want to consume realize a surplus of
V (0, α, ε, p) = −αε− ε
2
2
. (7)
Customers on traditional meters always pay their contracted retail price
and hence we have p = r in equation (6) for all 1
2
< α < α˜. The wholesale
price that consumers with smart meters pay can be either p∗ = p∗j or p
∗ = r.
We can have both prices for consumers with α˜ < α < 3
2
. The level of
the wholesale price depends on whether Ki is smaller or greater than K1.
If Ki ≥ K1 the residual monopoly price equals the retail price, while for
Ki < K1 the residual monopoly price lies on the linear downward sloping
part of the demand curve above the retail price. To account for the different
wholesale market prices in the welfare calculations we define a critical demand
shock, ε∗. Whenever the demand shock is larger than
ε∗ = {ε | Ki = K1} (8)
the low bidding firm’s capacity is relatively scarce and the wholesale price
becomes p∗ = p∗j . For lower demand shocks than ε
∗ the wholesale market
price remains equal to the retail price. The critical shock ε∗ depends on the
retail price. In the following we distinguish between equilibrium retail prices
of zero (case (i) in proposition 2), intermediate equilibrium retail prices (case
(ii)) and high equilibrium retail prices (case (iv)).
4.1 Equilibrium retail prices of zero
When capacities satisfy 1 ≤ Ki ≤ Kj the retail price is zero. In this scenario
the SO never has to intervene, because Ki +Kj ≥ 2 ≥ D0 holds and the two
firms can cover all demand at each price for all demand realizations. Figure
3 simplifies because K2 = D0, and the wholesale price can be either p
∗ = p∗j
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or p∗ = r = 0. For r = 0 the critical demand shock in equation (8) becomes
ε∗z =
8Ki + 4α˜
2 − 9
12− 8α˜ . (9)
In Appendix C.1 we derive ε∗z. If the demand shock is larger than ε
∗
z the
wholesale price becomes p∗ = p∗j , while for lower demand shocks the wholesale
market price is zero. Wholesale prices of p∗ = p∗j never occur as long as ε
∗
z > 1,
which holds as long as Ki > max{1, 18(3 − 2α˜)(7 + 2α˜)}. If Ki exceeds this
threshold the highest demand shock cannot be so large to make it optimal
for the high bidding firm to price above the retail price. Then all consumers
always pay a price of zero no matter whether they have a smart meter and
participate in the wholesale market or whether they have a retail contract
with a predetermined price. Therefore welfare is identical with aggregate
consumer surplus which is defined by
CS = W =
∫ 1
0
∫ 3
2
1
2
α2
2
dαdε =
13
24
. (10)
Generators do not earn any profits. If however 1 < Ki ≤ 18(3− 2α˜)(7 + 2α˜)
and ε∗z ≤ 1 then wholesale customers have to pay a positive price for some
states of demand. In these states retail customers are not served because
p∗ > r. This happens if ε∗ = ε∗z ≤ ε ≤ 1. The consumer surplus is now
CS =
∫ ε∗
0
∫ 3
2
1
2
α2
2
dαdε+
∫ 1
ε∗
∫ α˜
1
2
−αε− ε
2
2
dαdε (11)
+
∫ 1
ε∗
∫ 3
2
α˜
α(α− p∗)− (α− p
∗)2
2
− p∗(α + ε− p∗)dαdε.
Substituting the relevant price which is always given by p∗j from (19) we
can show that ∂CS
∂α˜
> 0 holds. Aggregate consumer surplus decreases if
the level of smart metering increases (meaning that α˜ decreases). While
wholesale costumers face price risks in potentially having to pay positive
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duopoly prices, retail customers are not served for some demand realizations.
By increasing the number of wholesale customers the first effect aggravates,
whereas the second is softened. Since consumer surplus is reduced the first
effect dominates the second. The producer surplus is given by
PS = pii + pij =
∫ 1
ε1
∫ 3
2
α˜
p∗(α + ε− p∗)dαdε. (12)
The producer surplus increases with the level of smart metering since ∂PS
∂α˜
<
0 holds. This is not surprising because more smart metering means more
demand situations in which wholesale customers pay a positive price and,
on top of it, there are more wholesale customers who have to pay the higher
price. Because of the opposing nature of consumer and producer surplus,
welfare is U-shaped in the level of smart metering. For small α˜ we have
∂W
∂α˜
< 0 while for larger we have ∂W
∂α˜
> 0. Obviously the effect on the profits
dominates welfare for small α˜, whereas for large α˜ the effect on consumer
surplus dominates. Figure 6 depicts the welfare results for retail prices of
zero and a given capacity of the low bidding firm.
Figure 6: Welfare depending on α˜ for retail prices of zero.
An increase in the level of smart metering from no smart metering at all
(α˜ = 3
2
) does first not have an effect on welfare, consumer surplus or profits.
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Welfare is constant as long as the degree of smart metering is low enough
and α˜ is above a certain threshold (α˜ >
√
25−8Ki
2
−1) that ensures that ε∗z > 1
and p∗ = r = 0 always hold. Above this threshold the retail market is so
large that the residual monopoly profit is always maximized at the retail
price. For degrees of smart metering below this threshold the high bidding
firm maximizes its profits by clearing the market above the retail price for at
least some states of demand realization. Then consumer surplus and welfare
decrease. The loss of consumer surplus due to uncertain prices above the
marginal cost level cannot be compensated by the larger producer surplus
and by the fact that fewer retail customers are sometimes not served. When
smart metering is further extended, the two latter effects start dominating
the first and finally, if all customers are on smart meters the wholesale price
is approaching zero again. In the Bertrand case, when Kj > Ki > 2 = D0,
welfare is the same with all consumers on smart meters or none at all.
4.2 Intermediate equilibrium retail prices
When the two firms’ capacities become scarcer the retail price is 2(1−Ki)
5−2α˜ ,
as described in proposition 2. This retail price is always lower than 1
2
+ ε,
and hence all retail customers demand electricity. The SO might have to
intervene, because Ki +Kj < D(r) is possible for some states of the demand
realization. To focus on the case where firms clear the market at their bid
and the wholesale price can be either p∗ = p∗j or p
∗ = 2(1−Ki)
5−2α˜ we introduce
the following condition. As long as
Ki ≥ D(r | ε = 1)−Kj = 8 + 2α˜(Kj − 2)− 5Kj
3− 2α˜ (13)
holds, the SO never has to set the price at pˆ > r. Equation (13) ensures that
the two firms can cover the market at the retail price even for the highest
demand shock. We derive this condition in Appendix C.2 and show that
under this condition firms are also able to cover all possible states of demand
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at the optimal price above the retail price, p∗ = p∗j . Similarly to the case
of zero retail prices we can now argue that whenever the demand shock is
larger than ε∗i the wholesale price becomes p
∗ = p∗j , while for lower demand
shocks the wholesale market price is p∗ = r = 2(1−Ki)
5−2α˜ . For the derivation of
the critical shock with intermediate retail prices, ε∗i , see Appendix C.1. Con-
sumer surplus and profits can then be calculated equivalently to equations
(11) and (12) respectively. Figure 7 illustrates the welfare results for a given
capacity of the low bidding firm.
Figure 7: Welfare depending on α˜ for intermediate retail prices.
Again, for a large enough α˜ such that only p∗ = r applies, all consumers
are always served and pay the same price no matter whether they are on
smart metering or not. In this case all effects of a variation of α˜ are driven
by the change in the price. Due to ∂r¯
∂α˜
> 0, contrary to the case for zero retail
prices, consumers like an increase in smart metering because they consume
more and pay less (∂CS
∂α˜
< 0). We find that ∂PS
∂α˜
> 0 and that producer
surplus reduces as the level of smart metering increases because despite their
increased electricity consumption consumers pay less. More smart metering
increases welfare (∂W
∂α˜
< 0) because it reduces market power without any con-
sumer being forced to leave the market. When the degree of smart metering
is above the threshold the pivotal firm, depending on the demand shock,
clears the market at or above the retail price. In this case more smart me-
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tering means a decrease in the consumer surplus (∂CS
∂α˜
> 0) and an increase
in the producer surplus (∂PS
∂α˜
< 0). The level of welfare is U-shaped again.
The same arguments that explain the U-shaped effect for zero retail prices
also apply for intermediate retail prices.
4.3 High equilibrium retail prices
The retail price becomes 3−α˜− 1
2
√
27− 4α˜(6− α˜) + 8Ki for relatively scarce
capacities. Again, if Ki ≥ D(r | ε = 1) − Kj holds, the wholesale market
always clears at the optimal bid of the pivotal firm. We only have wholesale
prices equal to the retail price for low shocks that satisfy ε < ε∗h. For demand
shocks ε∗h < ε < 1 the wholesale price is above the retail price. In Appendix
C.1 and C.2 we derive ε∗h and the functional form of the market clearing
condition Ki ≥ D(r | ε = 1) − Kj, for which the SO does not have to
intervene and set scarcity prices. Opposing to the case of intermediate retail
prices, for high retail prices we can have r > 1
2
+ε and some retail consumers
do not demand electricity. Given the retail price, whether all or only some
retail customers demand electricity depends on the demand shock. Hence for
ε < ε∗h we now derive consumer surplus as
CS =
∫ εf
0
∫ r−ε
1
2
−αε− ε
2
2
dαdε (14)
+
∫ εf
0
∫ α˜
r−ε
α(α− r)− (α− r)
2
2
− r(α + ε− r)dαdε
+
∫ 1
εf
∫ α˜
1
2
α(α− r)− (α− r)
2
2
− r(α + ε− r)dαdε
+
∫ 1
0
∫ 3
2
α˜
α(α− r)− (α− r)
2
2
− r(α + ε− r)dαdε,
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where εf decides on wheter r > 1
2
+ ε or r < 1
2
+ ε, so on whether the retail
market is partially or fully covered. Since ε < ε∗h and p
∗ = r for all demand
shocks, only the effects of ∂r¯
∂α˜
determine welfare. We again find ∂CS
∂α˜
< 0
and ∂W
∂α˜
< 0. More smart metering lowers the market price and increases
consumer surplus and welfare. Producer surplus, that is derived within the
same integrals as in equation (14), decreases as smart metering increases,
however only if the negative effect on profits of the lowered retail price is
offset by the positive effect that for lower retail prices the retail market is
fully covered for more demand realizations. For high Ki, that lead to high
retail prices and relatively greater losses if the retail market is not fully
covered, the latter effect starts dominating and producer surplus becomes
inverted U-shaped in the level of smart metering.
Whenever ε∗h < ε < 1 and the wholesale price changes with the demand
shock we derive consumer surplus as
CS =
∫ εf
0
∫ r−ε
1
2
−αε− ε
2
2
dαdε (15)
+
∫ εf
0
∫ α˜
r−ε
α(α− r)− (α− r)
2
2
− r(α + ε− r)dαdε
+
∫ ε∗h
εf
∫ α˜
1
2
α(α− r)− (α− r)
2
2
− r(α + ε− r)dαdε
+
∫ 1
ε∗h
∫ α˜
1
2
−αε− ε
2
2
dαdε
+
∫ 1
0
∫ 3
2
α˜
α(α− p∗)− (α− p
∗)2
2
− p∗(α + ε− p∗)dαdε.
Then like for intermediate retail prices ∂CS
∂α˜
> 0 holds and consumers dislike
smart metering. Producer surplus is increasing in the amount of smart me-
tering, unless the retail price is very high (for low Ki). If Ki is very low,
the retail price is very high and producer surplus becomes slightly U-shaped,
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because a sufficient number of customers have to be on smart meters to level
out the losses of retailers that pay high prices whenever p = r but leave the
market whenever the demand shock is high and p > r holds. In line with the
case of intermediate retail prices we find that welfare is U-shaped whenever
the market outcome changes with the demand realization, while welfare is
increasing if the wholesale market price equals the retail price for all demand
shocks. Overall, the comparative statics of smart metering on welfare for
high retail prices follow the patterns for intermediate retail prices.
5 Conclusion
This paper derives welfare effects of real-time pricing in electricity markets.
When electricity generating firms have market power in the wholesale market
and consumers are risk-averse, we show that real-time pricing does not have
to be efficiency enhancing. Overall welfare implications depend on the level
of firms’ capacities and on the magnitude of stochastic demand shocks. With
large capacities that always lead to Bertrand prices, we find no difference in
welfare when all or no consumers are on smart meters. When firms’ capacities
are smaller such that market power arises, firms can price relatively high in
times of high demand shocks. When this is the case, we show that for the
main cases in which the system operator does not need to intervene and
set prices, real-time pricing decreases consumer surplus, because risk-averse
consumers dislike high and uncertain prices. At the same time real-time
metering increases producer surplus, because more smart metering means
more demand situations in which more wholesale customers pay a price above
marginal costs. These two opposing effects lead to a U-shaped welfare in
smart metering whenever the demand shock can change equilibrium prices.
If however firms capacities are relatively large and the demand shock does
not change the wholesale price, smart metering can increase consumer surplus
and welfare. Our findings suggest that, before investing in smart meters and
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smart grids, dominant firm behavior and the welfare gain of fixed retail prices
that insure risk-averse consumers against price fluctuations should be taken
into consideration.
Appendix
A Proof or proposition 1
A.1 Case (i): Ki > D(0, r, α˜, ε), Kj > D(0, r, α˜, ε)
This is the usual Bertrand case because non of the firms is effectively capacity constrained.
If firm i bids pi = 0 and firm j bids pj = 0 with i, j = A,B, none of the two firms has an
incentive to deviate because they could not improve on their profit of 0. If the firms bid
pi = pj = p > 0 firm i’s and firm j’s profit would be identical and given by pii = pij =
1
2pD(p, r, α˜, ε). Then each firm has an incentive to slightly undercut its rival because then
it could realize instead pii,j = (p−)D(p−, r, α˜, ε) with → 0. If the firms bid pi > pj ≥ 0
then firm i’s profit is zero and firm j’s profit is pij = pjD(pj , r, α˜, ε). Here firm i has again
an incentive to slightly undercut firm j in order to realize pii = (pj − )D(pj − , r, α˜, ε)
with → 0 instead. Thus pi = pj = 0 is the only Nash equilibrium.
A.2 Case (ii): Ki < D(0, r, α˜, ε), Kj > D(0, r, α˜, ε)
Here only firm i is capacity constrained. Suppose both firms bid pi = pj = 0 and have
therefore zero profits, then only firm j has an incentive to deviate to a higher price pj > 0.
If it deviates it would serve the residual demand and would realize pij = pj(D(pj , r, α˜, ε)−
Ki) > 0 if pj were not too high. The optimal deviation would be to choose
p∗j = arg max
p
{p[D(p, r, α˜, ε)−Ki]} . (16)
The same price p∗j would also be a best response of firm j if firm i chooses pi with
0 ≤ pi < p∗j such that
(pi − ) min{D(pi − , r, α˜, ε),Kj} ≤ p∗j [D(p∗j , r, α˜, ε)−Ki] (17)
with → 0. The capacity constrained firm i does never want to deviate to pi > pj because
it could not generate any positive demand for itself this way. The low-bidding firm j would
28
serve the whole market and firm i would not increase its profits.
In order to determine p∗j we need to take into account the different cases of the demand
in equation (5) resulting from the situation on the retail market. We need to distinguish
three cases:
Fully Covered Retail Market (0 ≤ r ≤ 12 + ε): All consumers without real-time pric-
ing have a positive demand. The demand function is
D(p∗, r, α˜, ε) =

1 + ε− ( 32 − α˜)p∗ − (α˜− 12 )r if 0 ≤ p∗ ≤ r,
( 32 − α˜)( 12 ( 32 + α˜) + ε− p∗) if r < p∗ ≤ α˜+ ε,
1
2 (ε− p∗ + 32 )2 if α˜+ ε ≤ p∗ ≤ ε+ 32 ,
0 if p∗ > ε+ 32 .
(18)
Solving for p∗j yields the following solution
p∗j =

3+2α˜+4ε
8 − Ki3−2α˜ if 0 ≤ Ki < K1,
r if max{0,K1} ≤ Ki < K2,
2+2ε−2Ki−r(2α˜−1)
6−4α˜ if max{0,K2} < Ki < D0,
(19)
where K1, K2 and D0 are defined as
K1 =
(
3
2
− α˜
)(
3 + 2α˜
4
+ ε− 2r
)
(20)
−
√
r(4(2− α˜)α˜− 3)(1 + 2α˜+ 4ε− 4r)
2
,
K2 = 1 + ε−
(
5
2
− α˜
)
r and (21)
D0 = D(0, r, α˜, ε) = 1 + ε−
(
α˜− 1
2
)
r. (22)
Partially Covered Retail Market ( 12 + ε < r ≤ α˜+ ε): Some of the consumers with-
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out real-time pricing are priced out of the market. The demand function is
D(p∗, r, α˜, ε) =

( 32 − α˜)( 12 ( 32 + α˜) + ε− p∗)
+ 12 (α˜+ ε− r)2 if 0 ≤ p∗ ≤ r,
( 32 − α˜)( 12 ( 32 + α˜) + ε− p∗) if r < p∗ ≤ α˜+ ε,
1
2 (ε− p∗ + 32 )2 if α˜+ ε ≤ p∗ ≤ ε+ 32 ,
0 if p∗ > ε+ 32 .
(23)
Solving for p∗j here yields the following
p∗j =

r if 0 ≤ Ki < K ′2,
1
2
(
1
2
(
3
2 + α˜
)
+ ε+ (α˜+ε−r)
2−2Ki
3−2α˜
)
if max{0,K ′2} < Ki
< D′0,
(24)
where K ′2 and D
′
0 are defined as
K ′2 =
1
2
((
3
2
+ ε
)2
− 2r(3− α˜+ ε) + r2
)
and (25)
D′0 = D(0, r, α˜, ε) =
1
2
(
3
2
− α˜
)(
3
2
+ α˜+ 2ε
)
+ (α˜+ e− r)2. (26)
Uncovered Retail Market (r > α˜+ ε): All consumers without real-time prices are priced
out of the market. The Demand function is
D(p∗, r, α˜, ε) =

( 32 − α˜)( 12 ( 32 + α˜) + ε− p∗) if 0 < p∗ ≤ α˜+ ε,
1
2 (ε− p∗ + 32 )2 if α˜+ ε ≤ p∗ ≤ ε+ 32
0 if p∗ > ε+ 32 .
(27)
Solving for the the optimal p∗j yields
p∗j =
3 + 2α˜+ 4ε
8
− Ki
3− 2α˜ if 0 < Ki < D
′′
0 , (28)
with p∗j < α˜+ ε < r. D
′′
0 is defined as
D′′0 = D(0, r, α˜, ε) =
1
8
(3− 2α˜)(3 + 2α˜+ 4ε). (29)
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Note that independent of the specific case that we are looking at p∗j < a˜+ ε and
∂p∗j
∂Ki
< 0
always holds. Thus, all consumers with real-time pricing have a positive demand at p∗j
and it is never located at the non-linear part of the demand function, see figure 2. The
equilibrium (pi, pj) = (0, p
∗
j ) does always exist for this case. In addition condition (17)
is usually satisfied for a range of 0 ≤ pi ≤ p¯i where pi = p¯i satisfies the condition with
equality. p¯i is unique because one can show that the left-hand side of (17) is a convex
increasing or single peaked function with at most one point of discontinuity at pi = r for
all pi < p
∗
j . Given that the condition is never satisfied for pi = p
∗
j and always for pi = 0
there exists a unique 0 ≤ p¯i < p∗j such that condition (17) is satisfied for all 0 ≤ pi ≤ p¯i.
Thus we have multiple Nash equilibria with (pi, pj) = (pi, p
∗
j ) and 0 ≤ pi ≤ p¯i. They are
all pay-off equivalent and result in a unique auction price p∗ = p∗j .
A.3 Case (iii), (iv) and (v): Ki ≤ Kj < D(0, r, α˜, ε)
Here both firms are capacity constrained and both firms have an incentive to deviate from
pi = pj = 0 because both firm can benefit from a positive residual demand. Given that
the rival sticks to a price of zero each firm has an incentive to set
p∗j = arg max
p
{p[D(p, r, α˜, ε)−Ki]} or p∗i = arg max
p
{p[D(p, r, α˜, ε)−Kj ]} . (30)
Like in case (ii) in subsection A.2 this might even be a best response for a positive price
of one’s rival as long as (17) or the equivalent condition for firm i choosing p∗i holds.
Since both firms are capacity constrained, bidding a price above p∗j or p
∗
i is potentially
profitable for both firms. Therefore the Nash equilibria with either (pi, pj) = (pi, p
∗
j ) with
pi ≤ p¯i < p∗j and p¯i implicitly defined in (17) or (pi, pj) = (p∗i , pj) with pj ≤ p¯j < p∗i and
p¯j implicitly defined in the equivalent to (17) can only exist as long as the low-bidding
firm does not have an incentive to bid above the high-bidding firms price level.
Note that p∗j and p
∗
i are still defined by either (19), (24), or (28) or the equivalent
equations for p∗i depending on the retail price level. And no matter which definition applies
we can show that p∗j ≥ p∗i as long as Kj ≥ Ki. If (pi, pj) = (pi, p∗j ) with pi ≤ p¯i < p∗j holds
and the total capacity in the market is sufficient to satisfy D(p∗j , r, α˜, ε), the best pi > p
∗
j
would be pi = p
∗
j +  with → 0 for the low-capacity firm. Then firm i’s profit would be
(p∗j + )[D(p
∗
j + , r, α˜, ε) −Kj ] and this does never exceed the profit p∗jKi that it would
achieve with pi ≤ p¯i < p∗j . Thus the equilibrium with the low-capacity firm bidding low
with pi ≤ p¯i and the high-capacity firm bidding high with pj = p∗j > p¯i always exist for
Ki ≤ Kj < D(0, r, α˜, ε) as long as Ki +Kj ≥ D(p∗j , r, α˜, ε) holds. The latter condition is
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equivalent to Ki > Si with
Si =

1
4 (
3
2 − α˜)(3 + 2α˜+ 4ε)− 2Kj if 0 ≤ Kj < K1,
1 + ε− r −Kj if max{0,K1} ≤ Kj < K2,
1 + ε− (α˜− 12) r − 2Kj if max{0,K2} ≤ Kj < D0,
(31)
if 0 ≤ r ≤ 12 + ε,
Si =

(3+2ε−2r)2
8 −Kj if 0 ≤ Kj < K ′2,
1
8
(
9 + 12ε+ 4ε2 + 4r2 − 8(α˜+ ε)r)
−2Kj if max{0,K ′2} ≤ Kj
< D′0,
(32)
if the retail price fulfills 12 + ε < r ≤ α˜+ ε and
Si =
1
8
(
3
2
− α˜
)
(3 + 2α˜+ 4ε)− 2Kj if 0 ≤ Kj < D′′0 , (33)
if α˜+ ε < r.
If we now consider the other potential equilibrium with (pi, pj) = (p
∗
i , pj) with pj ≤
p¯j < p
∗
i , this equilibrium only exists if the high capacity firm j does not have an incentive
to deviate to a price with pj > p
∗
i . Since p
∗
j ≥ p∗i holds, the optimal deviation for the
high capacity firm is given by its p∗j that is defined in (19), (24), or (28), depending on
the relevant retail price level. Checking the profits from choosing p∗j > p
∗
i reveals that this
deviation is not beneficial if Ki ≥ Ki with
Ki =

1
8 (9 + 12ε− 4α˜(α˜+ 2ε)
−4√Kj(9 + 12ε− 8Kj − 4α˜(α˜+ 2ε))) if 0 ≤ Kj < K1
max
{
1
8 (9 + 12ε− 4α˜(α˜+ 2ε)
−8√2Kjr(3− 2α˜)) , 1 + ε−Kj − r} if min{0,K1}
≤ Kj < K2
max
{
1
8 (3− 2α˜)(3 + 2α˜+ 4ε)
−√Kj(2 + 2ε− 2Kj − r(2α˜− 1)),
2K2j+2(3−2α˜)(1+ε−r)r−Kj(2+2ε−r(α˜−1))
2r(3−2α˜)
}
if min{0,K2}
≤ Kj < D0
(34)
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if 0 ≤ r < 12 + ε,
Ki =

3+2ε−2r
8 −Kj if 0 ≤ Kj < K ′2
8K2j+(3−2α˜)(3+2ε−2r)2r−Kj((3+2ε)2−8r(α˜+ε)+4r2)
2r(3−2α˜) if K
′
2 ≤ Kj < K3
1
8
{
9− 8α˜r + 4[ε(3 + ε)− 2εr + r2]
+4
√
Kj
(
9 + 12ε+ 4ε2 − 8Kj + 4r2
−8(α˜+ ε)r)1/2
}
if max{K ′2,K3}
≤ Kj < D′0
(35)
if 12 + ε ≤ r < α˜+ ε and
Ki =
1
8
(9 + 12ε− 4α˜(α˜+ 2ε) (36)
−4
√
Kj(9 + 12ε− 8Kj − 4α˜(α˜+ 2ε))
)
if 0 ≤ Kj < D′′0 ,
if r > α˜ + ε. The parameter K3 in (35) is only relevant as long as K2 > K3 > D
′
0 holds
and is defined as
K3 =
1
16
(
9 + 12ε+ 4ε2 − 8α˜r − 8εr + 4r2 (37)
+
√
−128(3− 2α˜)2r2 + ((3 + 2ε)2 − 8(α˜+ ε)r + 4r2)2
)
. (38)
One can also show that Si ≤ Ki for the relevant ranges of Kj . Thus, the two types
of equilibrium with either (pi, pj) = (pi, p
∗
j ) and pi ≤ p¯i < p∗j or (pi, pj) = (p∗i , pj) and
pj ≤ p¯j < p∗i exist for Kj ≥ Ki ≥ Ki. For min{Kj ,Ki} > Ki ≥ Si only the equilibria
with (pi, pj) = (pi, p
∗
j ) and pi ≤ p¯i < p∗j exist. For Ki < Si the total capacity in the
market does not satisfy the total demand at p∗j any more. The system operator will set
the market clearing price pˆ. Both firms bid a price that does not exceed the anticipated
market clearing price because this would reduce their profit.
B Proof of proposition 2
The retailers will always compete the retail price down to a level where r ≤ p∗ is ensured
for all ε ∈ [0, 1] due to the Bertrand competition among them. From equations (19), (24)
and (28) and the definition of pˆ from case (v) in Proposition 1 it is obvious that ∂p
∗
∂ε ≥ 0
for all ε ∈ [0, 1] if p∗ ≥ 0. Thus r ≤ p∗ for all ε implies that r ≤ p∗ for ε = 0.
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If Ki < K2 or Ki < K
′
2 holds for ε = 0, then the retail price will always satisfy r ≤ p∗.
Alternatively, r ≤ p∗ might also occur for either K2 ≤ Ki < Si, or K ′2 ≤ Ki < Si, if the
system operator needs to set the price pˆ such that it exceeds the retail price for ε = 0.
Let us first assume that Ki and Kj are large enough that the system operator does
not need to set a price pˆ for Ki > K2 or Ki > K
′
2 such that it exceeds the retail price,
then Ki ≤ K2 or Ki ≤ K ′2 for the smallest ε = 0 is sufficient to ensure that r ≤ p∗ for all
ε ∈ [0, 1]. Taking into account p∗ from either (19) or (24) and solving these inequalities
for r yields
r < r′ =
3− α˜− 12
√
27− 4α˜(6− α˜) + 8Ki if 0 ≤ Ki < 12 (α˜− 12 ),
2(1−Ki)
5−2α˜ if
1
2
(
α˜− 12
) ≤ Ki < 1. (39)
The split occurs because for Ki <
1
2 (α˜− 12 ) the retail price threshold r1 exceeds 12 where,
given ε = 0, the retail market is no longer fully covered and the parameter K ′2 instead of K2
becomes relevant. For Kj ≥ Ki ≥ 1 the only possible outcome for the retail competition
is r = 0.
Let us now assume that Ki and Kj are not large enough to avoid the case that the
system operator needs to set a price pˆ ≥ r for some K2 < Ki ≤ Kj or K ′2 < Ki ≤ Kj if
ε = 0. The system operator price, given a fully covered retail market, is
pˆ =
2
(
1−Ki −Kj − r(α˜− 12 )
)
3− 2α˜ . (40)
The system operator price, given a partially covered retail market, is
pˆ =
9− 8Ki − 8Kj − 8α˜r + 4r2
12− 8α˜ . (41)
In order to ensure pˆ ≥ r
r ≤ r′′ =
 32 −
√
2(Ki +Kj) if 0 ≤ Ki < 12 −Kj ,
1−Ki −Kj if 12 −Kj ≤ Ki < 1−Kj ,
(42)
must hold.
Note that we do not need to consider the case where the retail market is uncovered
for ε = 0 because this implies that the retail price is too high for a positive demand of the
retail consumers and would be competed downward by the retail firms. In addition r′′ is
only relevant if r′ < r′′ for the given Ki ≤ Kj . Checking for which Ki ≤ Kj the inequality
holds yields the definition of r¯ in Proposition 2.
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C Welfare derivation
C.1 Critical shocks
The critical demand shock, ε∗, that decides on whether the wholesale price is at or above
the retail price can de derived as follows. Because ε∗ determines if Ki is smaller or larger
than K1, we set K1 from equation (20) equal to Ki and solve for ε. This yields
ε∗ = − α˜
2
+
2(Ki + 2r)
3− 2α˜ +
√
2
√
(3− 2α˜)2(2α˜− 1)r(2α˜+ 4Ki + 4r − 3)
(3− 2α˜)2 −
3
4
. (43)
For zero retail prices the critical shock is then
ε∗z =
8Ki + 4α˜
2 − 9
12− 8α˜ . (44)
Inserting the intermediate and the high retail prices from proposition 2 in equation (43)
yields the respective critical shocks ε∗i and ε
∗
h.
C.2 Conditions for market clearing
For the welfare analysis to be tractable, we assume that the firms can always clear the
market and the SO never has to intervene. For retail prices of zero this is given through
the capacity requirements that have to hold for the retail prices to be zero.
For intermediate and high retail prices capacities can be too low and the SO has to set
the market clearing price for some demand shocks. To calculate welfare when the firms
clear the market at their bids we define minimum capacity endowments such that the firms
are able to play p∗ = r or p∗ = p∗j .
Intermediate retail price are always below 12 and hence below
1
2 + ε and therefore the
retail market is always fully covered. Capacities have to fulfill Ki + Kj ≥ D(r | ε = 1),
where r < 12 + ε, and Ki +Kj ≥ D(p∗j | ε = 1). Rearranging the first condition yields
Ki ≥ 8 + 2α˜(Kj − 2)− 5Kj
3− 2α˜ . (45)
Because r < p∗j and hence D(r | ε = 1) > D(p∗j | ε = 1), whenever equation (45) is
satisfied, the firms can also cover the market at all optimal prices higher than the retail
price.
Likewise, for high retail prices, capacities have to fulfill Ki + Kj ≥ D(r | ε = 1) and
Ki + Kj ≥ D(p∗j | ε = 1). When ε = 1, r < 12 + ε = 32 always holds for high retail prices
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and the retail market is always fully covered. When r < 12 + ε and all retail customers
demand electricity the firms capacities have to satisfy Ki+Kj ≥ D(r | ε = 1) what implies
Ki
{
≥ α˜−Kj + 12
√
4(α˜− 4)α˜− 8Kj + 23 if Ki > − 12 (α˜− 6)α˜− 238
≤ α˜−Kj − 12
√
4(α˜− 4)α˜− 8Kj + 23 if Ki < − 12 (α˜− 6)α˜− 238
(46)
If the firms can cover all demand at the retail price when the retail market is fully covered,
they can also cover the reduced demand for a partially covered retail market and the
wholesale market at optimal prices above the retail price. Figure 8 illustrates the area
that equations (45) and (46) define.
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 
1
1
2
(
α˜− 1
2
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r = 0
45◦
r = 3− α˜− 1
2
√·
r =
2(1−Ki)
5−2α˜
Figure 8: Combinations of Ki and Kj that ensure p = r or p = p
∗
j .
References
Allcott, Hunt (2011) “Rethinking Real Time Electricity Pricing,” Resource and Energy
Economics, Vol. 33, pp. 820–842.
(2012) “The Smart Grid, Entry, and Imperfect Competition in Electricity Mar-
kets,” Working Paper 18071, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
36
Boisvert, Richard N., Peter Cappers, Charles Goldman, Bernie Neenan, and Nicole Hopper
(2007) “Customer Response to RTP in Competitive Markets: A Study of Niagara
Mohawk’s Standard Offer Tariff,” The Energy Journal, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 53–74.
Boom, Anette (2008) “Equilibrium Selection with Risk Dominance in a Multiple-unit
Unit Price Auction,” Working Paper 2-2008, Department of Economics, Copenhagen
Business School.
(2009) “Vertically Integrated Firms’ Investments in Electricity Generating Ca-
pacities,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 27, pp. 544–551.
Boom, Anette and Stefan Buehler (2007) “Restructuring Electricity Markets when De-
mand is Uncertain: Effects on Capacity Investments, Prices and Welfare,” Discussion
Paper 2007-09, Centre for Industrial Economics, Department of Economics, University
of Copenhagen.
Borenstein, Severin (2005) “The Long-run Efficiency of Real-time Electricity Pricing,” The
Energy Journal, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 93–116.
Borenstein, Severin and Stephen Holland (2005) “On the Efficiency of Competitive Elec-
tricity Markets with Time-invariant Retail Prices,” The Rand Journal of Economics,
Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 469–493.
Crew, Michael A., Chitru S. Fernando, and Paul R. Kleindorfer (1995) “The Theory of
Peak-load Pricing: A Survey,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp.
215–248.
Fabra, Natalia and Nils-Hendrik von der Fehr (2006) “Designing Electricity Auctions,”
The Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 23–46.
Holland, Stephen P. and Erin T. Mansur (2006) “The Short-run Effects of Time-Varying
Prices in Competitive Electricity Markets,” The Energy Journal, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp.
127–155.
Joskow, Paul and Jean Tirole (2006) “Retail Electricity Competition,” The Rand Journal
of Economics, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 799–815.
(2007) “Reliability and Competitive Elextricity Markets,” The Rand Journal of
Economics, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 60–84.
37
Patrick, Robert and Frank A. Wolak (2001) “Estimating the Customer-level Demand for
Electricity under Real-time Market Prices,” Working Paper 8213, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Stoft, Steven (2002) Power System Economics-Designing Markets for Electricity, New
York: IEEE Press and John Wiley & Sons.
Taylor, Thomas N., Peter M. Schwarz, and James E. Cochell (2005) “24/7 Hourly Response
to Electricity Real-Time Pricing with up to Eight Summers of Experience,” Journal of
Regulatory Economics, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 235–262.
The Economist (2007a) “Building the Smart Grid,” August.
(2007b) “Wiser wires,” August.
Wolak, Frank A. (2011) “Do Residential Customers Respond to Hourly Prices? Evidence
from a Dynamic Pricing Experiment,” American Economic Review: Papers & Proceed-
ings, Vol. 101, pp. 83–87.
Wolfram, Cathrine (1998) “Strategic Bidding in a Multiunit Auction: An Empirical Anal-
ysis of Bids to Supply Electricity in England and Wales,” The RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 703–725.
Zarnikau, Jay and Ian Hallett (2008) “Aggregate Industrial Energy Consumer Response
to Wholesale Prices in the Restructured Texas Electricity Market,” Energy Economics,
Vol. 30, pp. 1798–1808.
38
